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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
ARTICLE 52- ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS *
CPLR 5201: Future rents not subject to attachment.
CPLR 5201 provides in part that a money judgment can be
enforced against a debt when the debt is certain to become due.
In Glassman v. Hyder,127 plaintiff attached the future rents
payable to defendant under a long-term lease. The appellate divi-
sion, first department, reversing appellate term,128 held that rents
not yet due are contingent and, therefore, are not attachable as
debts to become due "certainly or upon demand."
It is apparent that whether the landlord will receive the rent
from a tenant is contingent; dependent upon both parties' abiding
by the terms of the contract of lease. If the landlord breaches the
contract, the tenant may be released from paying rent. If the
entire amount of the rent receipts could be attached, the probability
that the landlord will breach the contract is increased, i.e., he will
have less money to fulfill his contractual obligations of making
repairs, supplying heat, etc.
Thus the instant case appears to be a logical interpretation of
CPLR 5201 and is in conformity with prior law.'129
ARTICLE 55- APPEALS GENERALLY
CPLR 5522: Intervening decision of United States Supreme Court
will not upset a "final" decision.
In In re Huie,'30 claimant made a motion for reargument of
an earlier decided motion for which the statutory time for appeal
had expired. The trial court nevertheless granted the motion be-
cause a decision of the United States Supreme Court,13' in the
interim, indicated that claimant's prior motion was erroneously dis-
missed. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the appellate division's
reversal of the lower court's order, held that in the absence of the
special circumstances enumerated in CPLR 5015, e.g., the discovery
of new evidence, fraud, or lack of jurisdiction, a determination
which is not appealed should remain undisturbed.
* For a discussion of the latest developments on the "Seider" front see
the student note in this issue.
12728 App. Div. 2d 974, 283 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1st Dep't 1967).
128 For a discussion and criticism of the appellate teras decision see
The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST. JOHN's L. Rs-v. 128,
157 (1967).
1291t re Ryan, 294 N.Y. 85, 60 N.E.2d 817 (1945). But cf. Seider
v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
13020 N.Y.2d 568, 232 N.E.2d 642, 285 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1967).
131 The intervening case which precipitated this confusion was Schroeder
v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
1968 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The ratio decidendi underlying the decision is clear. If the
Court were to allow an appeal or reargument after the time for
appeal had expired, every decision would be left uncertain. More-
over, there would never be a "final" decision from which the claim-
ant could institute an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Rather than
create such uncertainty, then, the Court, in Huie, follows its past
policy of denying appeals when the statutory time limit has run. 2
ARTICLE 56- APPEALS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
CPLR 5601(a): Dismissal of affirmative defense is a "final order"
and appealable as such.
CPLR 5601 (a) provides that an appeal may be taken as of
right to the Court of Appeals "from an order of the appellate
division which finally determines the action." In Sirlin Plumb-
ing Co. v. Maple Hill Hontes, Inc.,3 3 the defendant interposed an
affirmative defense and counterclaim. The appellate division, sec-
ond department, granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss the affirmative
defense and counterclaim and the defendant appealed to the Court
of Appeals. Plaintiff sought dismissal of the appeal on the basis
that the order of the appellate division was not final. The Court
of Appeals reversed and denied the motion to dismiss, holding
that the determination of the issue by the appellate division "im-
pliedly severed it from the action," and to that extent it was
final. 3
4
Early cases have suggested that where the claim dismissed by
the appellate division was closely related to the claim still pending
the decision was not final. 135 In recent decisions though, the Court
of Appeals has taken a different position and has considered as
final, orders of the appellate division which have dismissed a claim
or cause of action although claims arising out of the same trans-
action -remain undecided. 36
132E.g., Deeves v. Fabric Fire Hose Co., 14 N.Y.Td 633, 198 N.E.2d
595, 249 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1964). Cf. People ex rel. Bankers Trust Co. v.
Graves, 270 N.Y. 316, 1 N.E.2d 114 (1936); Joannes Bros. Co. v. Lam-
born, 237 N.Y. 207, 142 N.E. 537 (1923).
13320 N.Y.2d 401, 232 N.F_2d 394, 283 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1967).
134 It is clear that there need not be any express direction for severance
in. the appellate division's order as long as the claim was actually severed.
See In re Gellatly, 283 N.Y. 125, 27 N.E.2d 809 (1940).
a5 See, e.g., Davis v. Cohn, 286 N.Y. 622, 36 N.E.2d 458 (1941); Cage
v. Rosenberg, 271 N.Y. 509, 2 N.E.2d 670 (1936).
13E.g., Janos v. Peck, 15 N.Y.2d 509, 202 N.E.2d 560, 254 N.Y.S.2d
115 (1964); Denker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 10 N.Y.2d 339,
179 N.E.2d 336, 223 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1961); Ingraham v. Anderson, 2 N.Y.2d
820, 140 N.E.2d 747, 159 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1957).
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